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 Demand response puts pressure on energy providers to consider new pricing schemes.
 We introduce cooperative demand response. It can cut energy bills by 10%.
 A capacity-pricing component can encourage reductions in peak demand.
 Cooperative demand response can benefit consumers and energy providers alike.a r t i c l e i n f o
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Private households are increasingly taking cooperative action to change their energy consumption pat-
terns in pursuit of green, social, and economic objectives. Cooperative demand response (DR) programs
can contribute to these common goals in several ways. To quantify their potential, we use detailed energy
consumption and production data collected from 201 households in Austin (Texas) over the year 2014 as
well as historic real-time prices from the Austin wholesale market. To simulate cooperative DR, we adapt
a load-scheduling algorithm to support both real-time retail prices and a capacity-pricing component
(two-part pricing schemes). Our results suggest that cooperative DR results in higher cost savings for
households than individual DR. Whereas cooperative DR that is based on real-time pricing alone leads
to an increase in peak demand, we show that adding a capacity-pricing component is able to counteract
this effect. The capacity-pricing component successfully reduces the cooperative’s peak demand and also
increases the cost savings potential. Effective peak shaving is furthermore only possible in a cooperative
setting. We conclude that cooperative DR programs are not only beneficial to customers but also to
energy providers. The use of appropriate tariffs allows consumers and suppliers to share these benefits
fairly.
 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an openaccess article under the CCBY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
There is a strong imperative for us to alter the way that we use
energy [1]: High levels of carbon emission, a growing opposition to
nuclear power in response to the 2011 reactor melt-down in
Fukushima, and technological advances have led to a shift towards
renewable energy sources (RES) in many countries. However, the
intermittency of RES creates considerable stability challenges for
energy providers and grid operators. Grid management presentsadditional challenges in that electricity networks themselves are
increasingly being recognized as major sources of carbon emis-
sions and need to be structured and operated in a more environ-
mentally sustainable manner [2].
Centralized demand-driven energy systems that reactively bal-
ance supply against demand at all times are no longer able to cope
with these challenges. Conversely, decentralization and the use of
microgrid structures has been identified as a more viable alterna-
tive [3]. Microgrids serve as a platform for balancing demand and
supply and they emphasize the idea of organizing and optimizing
electricity networks locally [4]. Microgrids can be managed by
commercial entities or even by retail consumers themselves via
energy cooperatives [5]. These cooperatives offer a maximum level
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handle conflicting interests of different stakeholders [4]. Although
in Germany, for example, energy cooperatives are considered to be
important building blocks in the transition towards more sustain-
able energy systems, there is surprisingly little in the literature on
their practical potential [6]. Energy cooperatives can allow house-
holds to collectively optimize their energy systems and reduce
their external dependencies, and can provide opportunities for
effective demand side management (DSM). In general, DSM includes
energy conservation efforts, energy efficiency measures, and
demand response (DR) programs which encourage changes in elec-
tricity usage via price or grid management signals [7–11]. In this
paper however, we only focus on demand response.
The idea of turning demand into an additional degree of free-
dom of the grid is not new. DR has been commonplace in the
industry and commercial sector for more than 30 years [12].
However, developments in smart metering technology and the
introduction of smart appliances have increased interest and
research in residential DR. Consequently, recent years have seen
considerable advances in both smart devices and operational con-
cepts for residential DR. However, the role of choice and the human
dimension of energy use have been downplayed in energy research
[13]. Consumers do not change their consumption patterns unless
they see benefits from such a change. A 2008 survey of 2900
households in five European countries (Austria, Germany, Italy,
Slovenia, and UK) suggests that the general acceptance rate for
smart devices is above 80%, but that consumers expect a percepti-
ble economic benefit from contributing to load management in
energy systems [14,15]. In other words, energy providers need to
buy flexibility from their customers [16]. More recent studies on
smart grid adoption suggest that acceptance levels are also increas-
ingly driven by social norms and environmental concerns, but that
financial benefits, i.e. lower electricity bills, still remain the most
fundamental motivational factor [17–19].
Reservations to DR can still outweigh these factors, if DR pro-
grams are either too complex [20] or if cost savings fail to meet
expectations [21]. In this context, Gottwalt et al. [22] calculate
that, for individual consumers who do not engage in microgenera-
tion, the savings from time-based tariffs and DR are rather low and
are largely offset by the costs of acquiring smart devices. They
therefore question whether the financial incentives are sufficient
to encourage households to participate in DR. Feuerriegel et al.
[23], however, argue that the real economic benefits of DR remain
to be quantified, yet they only approach this evaluation from the
limited perspective of an electricity retailer. One of their findings
is that electricity retailers gain an immense advantage from DR
while the average savings for the individual consumer are rela-
tively small. Thus, the main objectives in this study are to quantify
the economic benefits from the customer’s perspective, to deter-
mine what additional economic potential energy cooperatives
can provide, and to identify how a more widespread adoption of
microgrid structures and residential DR can be encouraged.
To tap into the full economic potential of DR, previous studies
have proposed a variety of control mechanisms that are most often
tailored to single households. Rastegar et al. [24] e.g. present an
one-household mixed integer linear programming (MILP)
approach incorporating smart devices, photovoltaic (PV) genera-
tion, storage, electric vehicles, and a time-of-use pricing scheme.
A similar MILP model formulation that additionally incorporates
load peak limitations is presented by Erdinc [25]. These two mech-
anisms generate a single up-front schedule for the entire planning
horizon, which makes them interesting for an evaluation study yet
rather unsuitable for dynamic operational implementation.
Conversely, Di Giorgio and Pimpinella [26] propose a MILP model
for event-driven real-time scheduling. Their idea is to rerun the
model, i.e. reschedule appliance execution times, whenever thereis a change in the environment, such as improved forecasts or user
interaction. An extension of this work also focuses on prosumers
by including distributed generation (DG), storage units, and elec-
tric vehicles (EV) [27]. Although all these mechanisms can offer
considerable energy bill savings, none of the authors aim for a
comprehensive evaluation of the actual economic potential.
While beneficial to consumers, individualistic DSM approaches
are not ideal for the grid. By design single-household mechanisms
attempt to cut individual electricity bills. This can cause a herding
phenomenon, when all consumers shift their loads to periods when
prices are low, generating new demand peaks [22]. However, intro-
ducing centrally coordinated peak control measures comes a con-
siderable electricity costs for individual consumers [26–28].
An alternative to single-household approaches are multiple-
household DR schemes. These mechanisms generally follow either
a decentralized or a centralized DR control paradigm [29].
Decentralized mechanisms do not have direct access to residential
loads. Instead, they try to encourage households to behave in a
mutually beneficial way. Ramchurn et al. [30] show that, in princi-
ple, globally optimal results are possible even without explicit
coordination between households, as long as all households follow
the same DR approach and do not readjust their load schedules too
often. Veit et al. [31] on the other hand opt for explicit coordination
via a dynamic pricing mechanism that presents consumers with
personalized prices in order to incentivize beneficial load-
shifting. These personalized prices effectively discourage subopti-
mal herding behavior. The authors set up an extensive case study
to establish the economic potential of coordination but the mech-
anism often fails to provide feasible solutions.
Centralized DR approaches are more robust as they do not
require iterative coordination. They transfer control from the indi-
vidual household to a single overarching mechanism. Conceptu-
ally, these approaches best reflect the idea of an energy
cooperative that centrally manages its own microgrid. Centralized
approaches have been proposed for scenarios with and without
microgeneration. Bradac et al. [32], for example, introduce a
multi-household MILP model for consumers that do not own
power generation systems. They indicate that their mechanism
can generate considerable economic potential but do not support
their results beyond exemplary appliance data. Zhang et al. [33]
include shared RES and propose a MILP to minimize the energy
cost of a microgrid that consists of a single smart apartment build-
ing. Based on illustrative appliance usage patterns they show that
cooperative scheduling can reduce electricity costs by at least 11%
compared to not using DR. However, they do not verify these find-
ings for actual historic consumer behavior.
Multiple-microgrid management integrates several microgrids
that might have differing objectives. Velik et al. [34] propose such
a multi-objective strategy that enables the integration of micro-
grids with environmental and economic objectives. Although not
explicitly considering DR, they find that cooperation between eco-
nomically and environmentally oriented parties can be beneficial
to both, regardless of their differing goals. Even without DR, coop-
erative behavior can thus be worthwhile for higher grid manage-
ment levels as well.
Given the growing importance of residential DR, and especially
the key role of financial stimuli, our work is intended to provide a
realistic estimation of the cost savings that cooperative DR can
offer today. As data from cooperative pilots is not yet available,
previous research has suggested smart grid simulations to test
cooperative DR in a risk-free environment [35,36]. We thus intro-
duce a simulation framework for a residential microgrid and fit it
with historic load and price data. The modelled microgrid connects
several homes, each equipped with various household appliances
and some homes additionally own EVs and/or photovoltaic panels.
These homes employ a MILP mechanism to collectively optimize
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dently, it is connected to a local energy provider which buys and
sells energy at real-time prices.
For the residential load profiles, we use real-world data from
the Pecan Street Inc. Dataport [37] which is the world’s largest
source of disaggregated (i.e. single appliance) data on residential
customer energy usage. It provides detailed consumption and pro-
duction data for more than 1200 households in the US, with 495
being located in Austin, Texas. For these Austin households, we
extract individual load curves for each single appliance, EV, or pho-
tovoltaic system in this home at each 15-min interval in 2014. We
subsequently fit these profiles into our framework and infer an
individual level of flexibility for each appliance run. Next, we use
wholesale market prices for the Austin area to derive appropriate
real-time retail tariffs. We finally run 100 simulations, each cover-
ing a different cooperative of ten homes and a new random single
week in 2014.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to use such
an extensive dataset of historic load data to investigate the poten-
tial of residential DR. In leveraging this data, our study has two
specific objectives. First, we are interested in the actual economic
advantage that cooperative DR offers over single household
approaches. Since we assume energy prices and load curves to be
known in advance, our results indicate an upper bound for these
savings. Second, we want to investigate whether cooperatives
can be financially incentivized to avoid the herding phenomenon
and to create aggregated load profiles that will benefit the grid
as a whole.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
describes our evaluation framework. Specifically, we introduce
our cooperative market setting and present the DR model applied
in the subsequent evaluation. Section 3 describes our dataset and
explains the modifications made to fit the data into the load-
shifting mechanism. Section 4 summarizes and discusses the key
results of our evaluations. Sections 5 and 6 provide concluding
remarks, discuss limitations, and outline opportunities for further
research.2. Evaluation framework
By using a large set of real-world data we avoid simplifying
usage characteristics and limitations regarding the number of uti-
lized load patterns. Focusing on residential DR, we model energy
cooperatives which only encompass domestic consumers and
domestic prosumers. These cooperatives include neither mutually
owned generation facilities nor commercial producers or storage
facilities. However, our approach can easily accommodate other
types of participants.2.1. Approach
For our simulation, we make a set of assumptions regarding the
cooperative environment. As illustrated in Fig. 1, the residential
cooperative encompasses several different homes (consumers),
each possessing various household appliances and occasionally
electric vehicles. Homes that additionally own photovoltaic panels
are denoted as prosumers. The cooperative pools all these con-
sumer and prosumer loads in a big single virtual home. This virtual
household is managed by an energy management system, termed
the central controller (CC), that coordinates all load-shifting activ-
ities. Once users activate their devices and specify a discretionary
level of flexibility, the CC takes full control over the shifting pro-
cess. Importantly, the CC does not expose individual homes to real
time price signals as these tend to overburden consumers [20]. To
ensure this level of convenience, we effectively take the idea ofreal-time, agent-assisted decision support [38] a step further and
have the agent, i.e. the central control mechanism, make the deci-
sion on behalf of the user.
The cooperative can buy and sell energy to the local utility com-
pany. Residential microgrid research often assumes variable buy-
ing prices and flat selling (feed-in) tariffs for excess production
[25,27,33,39]. However, we argue that this pricing scheme is not
flexible enough to cope with future challenges to the energy grid
and will not be a dominant model in the future. Therefore, we
assume both buying and selling prices to be variable.
Retail electricity bills generally include charges for the local
low- and medium-voltage distribution grid, and transmission fees
for high-voltage lines connecting local grids. As cooperatives effec-
tively operate their own distribution grid, they are billed only for
transmission charges, which are added whenever energy is bought
from the local utility company. Thus, the price for externally
bought energy is higher than the price for externally sold energy,
as it also includes the transmission charge. Energy transmitted
within the cooperative only requires local distribution, and the
resulting transmission savings can be shared between local con-
sumers and producers.
We will investigate the effects of collaboration among house-
holds by comparing the simulation results from a scenario without
DR to two scenarios with DR: First, we consider each household as
an individual customer, and, second, we consider all households to
be part of an energy cooperative. This cooperative only exchanges
excess demand and supply with the energy provider. For simplifi-
cation we do not differentiate between different entities on the
provider side (utilities, grid operator, etc.), and we use the term
‘energy provider’ for all external counterparts.
Furthermore, flat feed-in tariffs and consumption-based usage
tariffs are generally designed for single residential customers.
Cooperatives, however, have consumption and production levels
closer to those of small or medium commercial customers.
Commercial pricing schemes are often two-part, which means they
consist of a capacity and a quantity fee. Combining this kind of
pricing scheme with DR can result in reduced peak demand, which
is beneficial for energy providers [23]. We argue that energy provi-
ders have to share their benefits from peak reduction with con-
sumers in order to incentivize peak-shaving behavior. With the
right proportion of quantity and capacity, two-part pricing
schemes are then beneficial for both parties. Therefore, we will
run our simulation with several tariffs and compare the effects
on total energy bills and peak consumption.2.2. Model
For the central control mechanism we adapt the scheduling
mechanism proposed by Bradac et al. [32] which is designed to
enable cost-optimal load shifting for domestic appliances. Their
objective is to minimize the cost of electricity procurement for
shiftable loads; microgeneration and fixed loads are not consid-
ered. Accordingly, loads are simply moved to periods when exter-
nal buying prices are low.
The initial model uses the concept of energy phases to remodel
discrete load curves for six types of household appliance (washing
machine, dishwasher, tumble dryer, electronic water heater, elec-
tric oven, and home lighting subsystem) from historic energy pro-
files of such appliances. This results in one load curve for each type
of appliance, which is then used to simulate this device in every
household. Our data provides much more detailed consumption
profiles that not only differ for every household but for every single
time an appliance is used. Instead of modelling appliances
uniformly, we adapt the model to support this large set of real-
world data.
Fig. 1. Design of a high-level cooperative. The central controller acts as an aggregator/broker [40,41] for the cooperative that exchanges electricity with the external energy
provider. The model is capable of including producers as well but the data used only includes consumers and prosumers.
Table 1
Nomenclature.
Variable Unit Description
Indices and model size parameters
h None Household index
i None Appliance run index. An appliance run represents,
for example, a single use of a washing machine or
one cooling cycle of a refrigerator
t None Time slot index
H None Total number of households
I None Total number of appliance runs
T None Total number of time slots in the simulation
Variables
p kW Maximum peak over the entire simulation:
maximum amount of electricity that is exchanged
with the grid in a single period
tc USD Total cost for purchasing electricity
xh;i;t None Appliance is active. Binary variable; one if appliance
run i in household h is active in time slot t
yh;i;t None Prevents repetition of an already finished appliance
run. Binary variable; one if appliance run i in
household h is already finished in time slot t
zdt kW h Difference between generation and usage if time
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essential aspects:
(i) We adapt the objective function from a pure real-time mar-
ket (RTM) price optimal DR to also include revenues from
production and peak charges. The overall cost is thus calcu-
lated as the sum of a capacity (peak) and a quantity (usage)
component. We also introduce a set of new constraints to
accommodate generation and to consider peak loads.
(ii) We extend the model to support real-world input data.
Therefore, we define i 2 I as an appliance run, not as a
specific appliance (For a table of notation, see Table 1).
Thereby, every appliance run (e.g., every cooling cycle of a
refrigerator or the single use of a washing machine) is
defined by the unique properties {start-time, end-time, load}
which we determine from historic data. To handle the
increased complexity, we drop the differentiation between
the different program phases. However, it is theoretically
possible to model the different program phases as individual
appliance runs.slot t is a period of overdemand; to be weighted
with the buying price of energy. Continuous
variable (always non-negative)
zst kW h Difference between generation and usage if time
slot t is a period of oversupply; to be weighted with
the selling price of energy. Continuous variable
(always non-negative)
Constants
AH None Appliance run to household matrix. Each appliance
run can only belong to one household (H  I)
CC USD/kW Capacity charge
EB USD/kW h External buying price (T  1)
ES USD/kW h External selling price (T  1)
FL kW h Fixed load. Residual, non-shiftable loads (T  1)
PT None Processing time of each appliance run (I  1)
PC kW h Power consumed by each appliance run (I  1)
Gen kW h Produced energy (T  1)
UP None User preference matrix that defines the possible
execution window for appliances (I  T). A value of
one states that appliance run i can be scheduled in
time slot tmintc ¼
X
t
ðEBt  zdt  ESt  zst Þ þ CC  p; ð1Þ
xh;i;t 6 AHh;i 8h; i; t ð2Þ
XT
t¼1
xh;i;t ¼ PTi 8h; i ð3Þ
ðxh;i;t1  xh;i;tÞ  yh;i;t 6 0 8h; i; t : t > 1 ð4Þ
xh;i;t 6 UPi;t 8h; i; t ð5Þ
xh;i;t þ yh;i;t 6 1 8h; i; t ð6Þ
yh;i;t1  yh;i;t 6 0 8h; i; t : t > 1 ð7ÞX
h;i
PCi  xh;i;t  zdt þ zst ¼ ðGent þ FLtÞ 8t ð8Þ
zdt  zst ¼ 0 8t ð9Þ
zdt  p 6 0 8t ð10Þ
zst  p 6 0 8t ð11Þ
zdt P 0; zst P 0; xh;i;t 2 f0;1g; yh;i;t 2 f0;1g 8h; i; t ð12Þ
The objective of our mechanism is to reduce the overall electric-
ity costs of the cooperative over the time horizon we are simulat-
ing. In Eq. (1) zdt signifies the amount of externally sourced
electricity if there is overdemand (demand exceeds production),
whereas zst is the amount of feed-in electricity in times of oversup-
ply (production exceeds demand). Excess demand and excess
generation are weighted by the external buying price EBt and theexternal selling price ESt respectively. In line with existing two-
part pricing schemes (cf. Section 3.2), the capacity charge (CC) is
a monetary amount that is multiplied by the highest absolute peak
demand or peak generation p over the optimization horizon. Put
differently, we minimize the total costs (tc) which consist of the
costs for energy consumed plus peak costs minus generation
revenues.
Table 2
Classification of available Pecan Street devices.
Controllable devices Non-controllable devices
Fully automatic Semi-automatic Fixed
Air conditioning Washing machine Lighting
Freezer Dishwasher Kitchen appliances (oven, garbage
disposal, water heater, wine cooler,
etc.)
Furnace Dryer
Refrigerator Electric vehicle Plugs
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these we introduce a set of binary decision variables xh;i;t and
yh;i;t . The x variables are 1 if the particular appliance run i belongs
to the particular household h and occurs at point t. The y variables
are set to 1 after an appliance run is finished in order to prevent the
same appliance run from being repeated.
The binary matrix AH defines which appliance run belongs to
which household, and is 1 if the i-th appliance run belongs to the
h-th household, and 0 otherwise. Eq. (2) consequently ensures that
an appliance can only run in the particular household it belongs to.
The vector PT defines the processing time for each appliance run.
Constraint (3) hence requires that each appliance runs for precisely
the time specified by PT . Constraint (4) ensures that an appliance
run cannot be interrupted. The binary matrix UP specifies user
preferences, i.e., the execution window for each appliance run. Its
elements are 1 for each time point in the respective execution win-
dow, and 0 otherwise. Constraint (5) thus allows every appliance
run to be performed only in its dedicated execution window. Con-
straint (6) and (7) ensure that a specific appliance run cannot be
repeated after it has finished.
The vector PC describes the average load for each appliance run
over its execution time. Constraint (8) allocates the amount of
excess demand to zdt and the amount of excess supply to zst . Con-
straint (9) is introduced so that there cannot be oversupply and
overdemand at the same time. Constraint (10) and (11) are intro-
duced so that p cannot be smaller than the highest absolute peak.
As p is a major component of the total cost, the mechanism seeks to
reduce p. Thus, its final value will equal the highest absolute peak.
Lastly, constraint (12) stipulates that the z variables are non-
negative to ensure that overdemand cannot be expressed by nega-
tive oversupply, and vice versa. Also, it ensures that the x and y
variables are binary.3. Dataset
For our evaluation, we utilize different data sources for the load
data as well as for the price data. The Pecan Street Inc. Dataport
[37] is the world’s largest source of disaggregated customer energy
data. It provides historic load profiles at the individual appliance-
level as well as PV production data from 1200 volunteer house-
holds located in Texas, Colorado and California. The data is avail-
able for 15-min intervals for the years 2011–2015. Austin (Texas)
is the city with the highest number of participating households
(n = 495). Since we aim to simulate local microgrids as realistically
as possible, we only use load data from the Austin area for our
simulation.
For the same area, electricity prices are provided by the Electric
Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT). Since no RTM prices are
offered to retail customers in Austin, we use publicly available
15-min RTM settlement point prices (SPP) quoted for the Austin
load zone, and we scale these to the retail level at a later stage.
3.1. Load data
To use historic load profiles from the Pecan Street Inc. Dataport
[37] for our model, we have to infer the flexibility that ‘‘smart”
appliances would have. Because of the complexity involved we
cannot handle all existing appliance types separately. Thus, the
appliance-level data for smart devices is categorized according to
their controllability. Similar approaches have already been used
in recent literature [22,26,27]. Following the terminology of Gott-
walt et al. [22], we distinguish between three different load types.
Fully automatically controllable loads are consumed by appliances
that are always turned on (auto-shiftable devices) and can be con-
trolled within device-specific constraints. For example, a refrigera-tor can shift its cooling cycles for a certain time period without
affecting the temperature inside to any significant extent. Semi
automatically controllable loads such as the cycles of a dishwasher
(semi-shiftable devices), for example, require some user interaction
in the beginning and can then be scheduled within certain user-
dependent boundaries. Fixed loads depend completely on user
interaction and have no potential for shifting. Table 2 shows how
controllable devices are classified. All other loads such as stoves,
lighting and instant water heaters are considered to be fixed.
Fixed loads do not require any modification to be used in our
simulation, whereas controllable loads require some pre-
processing before they can be plugged into our model. Both classes
of controllable loads consume a certain base load which cannot be
shifted. Although semi-shiftable devices are generally not running
until users interact with them, some of them consume standby
energy. All fully shiftable devices in Table 2 possess a natural ther-
mal storage, and hence do not run continuously [22]. However,
these appliances still consume energy even when not cooling or
heating.
Therefore, both controllable load classes can be split into shifta-
ble and non-shiftable parts of the load. Fig. 2 shows a typical load
curve of a refrigerator from the Pecan Street dataset. The non-
shiftable load is constant at a level below the average load, but
we found that the shiftable parts are generally at a level above
the average load. Therefore, the average load over the simulation
period provides a viable indicator of whether a specific load is shif-
table or non-shiftable. We use this to extract the non-shiftable part
of an appliance’s load: All data points below the average are con-
sidered non-shiftable while all data points above the average are
considered to be part of a shiftable operation. Even during a shifta-
ble operation, the non-shiftable part cannot be shifted. Therefore,
the average of all loads smaller than the overall average is used
to determine a constant load, which is then subtracted from the
load curve and added to the fixed loads. This results in a new load
curve of ‘‘pure” shiftable load (Fig. 3) with no non-shiftable part. All
loads smaller than the average are now zero.
This shiftable load curve can now be cut into shiftable blocks. To
fit our model, each of these blocks is described by its start time,
duration, latest finish and average load and can be shifted within
specific boundaries. Fig. 3 shows how the shiftable blocks deviate
from the shiftable curve. On average, the shiftable blocks deviate
by 7.7% from the actual loads, but are easier to work with for the
purposes of our simulation. The total energy consumed when a
shiftable load is converted to a shiftable block remains the same.
Whenever a device starts to consume energy, we set the earliest
start point. The distance between actual start and actual finish
determines the duration of the appliance run. We determine the
average load of a block by averaging all shiftable loads of the speci-
fic operation.
As mentioned before, for fully automatically controllable loads
the boundaries for shifting are specific to each device class, while
for semi-automatically controllable loads they depend on user
preferences (cf. Fig. 4). Our idea on how to model these user pref-
erences is inspired by a widespread belief of how smart appliances
Fig. 2. Cooling cycles of a refrigerator. Periods of high consumption alternate with periods of low consumption (only non-shiftable consumption).
Fig. 3. Pre-processed shiftable loads of a refrigerator. On average, the shiftable blocks deviate by 7.7% from the actual loads, but are easier to work with for the purposes of our
simulation.
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on a device, the user can define a deadline by which the appliance
program needs to be completed. This idea has also been transferred
to the charging of electric vehicles where the user provides infor-
mation about the start of his or her next trip [42]. The actual exe-
cution time is then determined by the scheduling algorithm (cf.
Section 2.2). To simulate varying user preferences, we determine
user-defined finish times by multiplying the duration of an appli-
ance run with a normally distributed random factor. A sensitivity
analysis on the mean and standard deviation for this factor has
shown no significant improvement beyond a mean greater than
3, and the standard deviation’s impact on the results is negligible.
Since we aim to estimate an upper bound for the benefits of DR but
also to keep the setting realistic, we set this parameter for our sim-
ulations to N(3,1). It is important to ensure that latest finish andFig. 4. Concept of controllable loads. On the left are semi-automatically control-
lable loads, on the right fully automatically controllable loads. The maximum
shifting time for each device class is shown in Table 3.earliest start allow for the whole duration of the appliance run,
i.e. the factor cannot be smaller than 1. In addition, a previous
run has to be finished before a subsequent run is programmed.
For example, if a user knows that he needs the dryer twice in
one evening, he will set the latest end-point of the first run accord-
ingly. In general, users might also decide to reclaim control over
their devices as long as they have not started yet. For our simula-
tion however, we assume that they only give up uncritical levels
of flexibility and stick to their decision once they have set a shifting
window.
Auto-shiftable devices generally operate in an intermittent
mode. A refrigerator’s heat pump, for example, only activates when
the compartment temperature exceeds a certain limit. A furnace
rarely reheats its water tank more than twice a day. Consumers
also do not actively monitor these cycles. So, as long as there are
no perceptible differences, as e.g. rotten vegetables in the refriger-
ator or the lack of warm water (for a shower), we assume that con-
sumers can be convinced to grant control over their devices. The
timeframes where changes are generally unnoticeable, i.e. the
maximum allowable shifting times are derived from literature
[14]. A list of these times is shown in Table 3. These shifting limits,
however, only partially reflect the flexibility potential of auto-
shiftable devices. Limited levels of user interaction not only make
their load patterns intermittent but also highly predictable. This
effectively means that they can be run preemptively as well. It
matters little if a refrigerator starts cooling when its interior tem-
perature hits 7 C or only 15 min later when it hits 8 C. We conse-
quently refined the shifting window to allow for preemptive and
delayed operability. A refrigerator’s cooling cycle for example is
Table 3
Fully automatic shifting times.
Device class Maximum shifting time (in min)
Air conditioning 60
Freezer 30
Furnace 60
Refrigerator 30
Table 5
Two-part pricing scheme.
Oct–May June–
September
Weighted
average
Capacity charge (per kW) $9.15 $10.15 $9.50
Retail price (per kW h) $0.06 $0.07 –
Retail adjustment factor 1.54 1.85 1.65
Table 4
Consumption-based scheme.
October–
May
June–
September
Weighted
average
Capacity charge (per kW) n/a
Retail price (per kW h) $0.08 $0.10 –
Retail adjustment factor 2.10 2.79 2.34
Table 6
Interpolated tariffs for the simulation.
Retail adjustment factor Capacity charge
Tariff 1 (Consumption-based) 2.34 $0.00
Tariff 2 2.20 $1.90
Tariff 3 2.06 $3.80
Tariff 4 1.93 $5.70
Tariff 5 1.79 $7.60
Tariff 6 (Two-part) 1.65 $9.50
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the two-way shiftability, we split these 30 min and add 15 min
of slack before the actual start time and after the finish time of
the cooling cycle.
Using the methods described above, we pre-process the load
curves of all schedulable appliances into shiftable blocks with the
length of the load duration and height of the average consumption
of each load that indicates an appliance run. Additionally, we cal-
culate an execution window for each appliance run.
Fig. 5 shows the weekly load profile of a single household before
and after converting the shiftable loads to shiftable blocks. Consid-
ering shiftable loads with their average consumption over their
entire duration causes some smoothing, but both curves are highly
correlated, with a Pearson correlation coefficient of 0.96.
3.2. Price Data
To determine the transmission spread between selling prices and
buying prices (cf. Section 2.1) we utilize an existing regulatory
charge. It covers ERCOT transmission service charges and credits
as well as several administrative and regulatory fees. As of Novem-
ber 1st, 2013 the regulatory charge amounts to $0.0794 per kW h
[43]. This equals a spread between average buying and selling
prices of about 22% from 2013 to 2015.
The objective function (1), introduced in Section 2.2, can handle
two-part pricing schemes that are split into a capacity part and a
quantity part. To conduct a sensitivity analysis of our results
regarding the chosen energy tariff, we derive a set of six hypothet-
ical tariffs from two existing electricity rate schedules offered by
Austin Energy to small commercial customers [43]. The first sched-
ule is based solely on energy consumption and is offered to cus-
tomers with a capacity of less than 10 kW. The second schedule
is split into a capacity and a quantity part and is offered to
customers with a capacity of between 10 and 50 kW. For both
schedules we calculate a retail adjustment factor (RAF) which isFig. 5. Total net load of a household before and after conversion. The conthe quotient of the flat retail price and the average wholesale price
for the corresponding year. As shown in Tables 4 and 5, Austin
Energy charges higher energy prices during the summer months
from June to September. We decided to utilize weighted average
values for the RAFs and the capacity charge for simplification.
The capacity charge is multiplied by the metered kilowatts dur-
ing the 15-min interval of greatest monthly use (monthly peak).
For simulation runs of less than one month, the charge is adjusted
to the particular duration and is applied to the highest peak of the
simulation period.
Tariffs 1 and 6 are derived directly from the two pricing
schemes; the other tariffs are determined by linear interpolation
(see Table 6).version causes smoothing, but both load curves are highly correlated.
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All subsequent results are based on 2014 data for households in
Austin. To ensure data quality, we only included households for
which single-appliance-level data is available for all 15-min inter-
vals throughout 2014. This effectively reduces the number from
495 households registered with Pecan Street to a set of 201 house-
holds. From this pool, we built 100 cooperatives by randomly pick-
ing 10 individual households each. A cooperative size of 10
households results in an aggregated peak load of between 20 and
30 kW, which fits the two-part tariffs described in Section 3.2.
Due to the computational complexity, we chose a simulation
timeframe of a single week. Therefore, loads can only be scheduled
within a particular weekly block, and there is no overlap between
blocks. This loss in scheduling flexibility is also known as the end-
of-horizon effect [44]. Comparing monthly simulations to weekly
blocks for smaller cooperatives, however, showed the end-of-
horizon effect to be negligible. Additionally, we cannot apply a
monthly capacity charge to a weekly load profile. We thus scaled
down the monthly charge by 7/30 to arrive at a weekly charge.
To cover the entire year 2014, we randomly selected a new week
for each of the 100 cooperatives. Finally, we averaged the results
over 100 weekly simulations, effectively eliminating the effects
of seasonal variations.
For each simulation, we calculate three scenarios (BASE/NO-DR,
INDIV, and COOP). Scenario BASE serves as a benchmark scenario,
in which consumers do not shift loads although real-time prices
are used to calculate their energy bills. Scenario BASE only exists
for tariff 1 (consumption-based); for all two-part tariffs (tariffs
2–6) the scenario without DR is called NO-DR. Scenario INDIV does
not permit cooperation between households. Rather, every house-
hold applies the DR mechanism introduced in Section 2.2 to its
own loads independently. Scenario COOP reflects an actual cooper-
ative with both internal trading and a single common DR mecha-
nism – i.e., all loads are pooled and load shifting is centrally
coordinated. Scenario Coop generally took the longest to solve,
averaging 57 min on a 16 GB RAM (100 GB virtual memory) com-
puter with an INTEL Xeon CPU with two cores @ 2.53 GHz, run-
ning Gurobi 6.0.4.Table 7
Averaged results for tariff 1 (consumption-based).
Tariff Scenario Electricity
cost (in $)
Electricity cost reduction
(change in % compared to BASE)
Peak
(in k
1 BASE 209.7 0.0 28.1
(RAF = 2.34 INDIV 198.3 5.5 29.3
CC = 0.00) COOP 195.6 6.8 29.3
Fig. 6. Different simulation scenarios without capacity pricing (tariff 1). In (i) loads ar
overdemand to periods of oversupply.Fig. 6 depicts the resulting aggregated load levels of all house-
holds (left y-axis) on two subsequent sample days. To emphasize
the connection between load and price, the retail adjusted price
is also plotted (right y-axis). Collectively, the household groups
we examined are net consumers most of the time. This observation
holds not only for the two sample days but also for most of the
sampled weeks. PV production depends not only on weather con-
ditions but also on the angle of incidence. This results in only a few
hours every day during which PV production can be exploited to its
full potential. As PV is the only source of microgeneration we con-
sider and as the households are located very close to each other,
generation patterns are very similar for all prosumers.
Scenarios INDIV and COOP generally focus on two interdepen-
dent objectives: (i) Loads are moved from periods of high prices
to periods of cheaper electricity. This can be observed e.g. between
5 pm and 8 pm on day 1. As far as possible, loads are shifted to
avoid the 6 pm price peak. (ii) The results can be improved further
by shifting from periods of overdemand to periods of oversupply,
thereby increasing the level of self-consumption. This adjustment
generally has the greatest potential as it does not only take advan-
tage of a change in price but also of the spread between buying and
selling prices. In Fig. 6 this objective is visible on the second morn-
ing between 6 am and 12 pm. Loads are shifted to avoid having to
buy energy expensively during a period of overdemand and high
prices and having to sell the same amount of energy cheaply dur-
ing a period of oversupply and low prices.
Clearly, objective (ii) has more potential for cost savings per
unit of energy. However, utilizing only microgeneration from PV
panels provides few opportunities to maximize self-consumption
as many execution windows of shiftable operations do not coincide
with periods of PV production. Therefore, taking additional RES
such as wind into account is likely to improve the effectiveness
of DR measures.
For the pure consumption-based tariff (tariff 1), the simulation
results indicate that in scenario INDIV non-cooperative behavior
yields average cost savings of 5.5% (compared to BASE), and in sce-
nario COOP the savings for cooperative behavior are 6.8% (cf.
Table 7). On an annual basis, this equates to average electricity bill
savings of 59 USD per household in scenario INDIV. Forload
W)
Peak load reduction
(in % of BASE)
Load
kurtosis
Load kurtosis reduction
(change in % compared to BASE)
0.0 3.2 0.0
4.1 3.3 2.1
4.1 3.3 1.2
e shifted to periods of cheaper electricity. In (ii) loads are shifted from periods of
Table 8
Averaged results for tariff 6 (two-part pricing scheme).
Tariff Scenario Electricity
cost (in $)
Electricity cost reduction
(change in % compared to BASE)
Peak load
(in kW)
Peak load reduction
(in % of BASE)
Load
kurtosis
Load kurtosis reduction
(change in % compared to BASE)
6 NO-DR 272.5 29.9 28.1 0.0 3.2 0.0
(RAF = 1.65 INDIV 251.4 19.9 27.8 1.9 3.2 1.2
CC = 9.50) COOP 188.7 10.0 24.0 14.5 3.0 8.1
Fig. 7. Load curves of two different pricing schemes under cooperative behavior. The pure quantity-based tariff 1 creates new peaks while tariff 6 (two-part pricing scheme)
reduces the overall peak of the cooperative.
1 For interpretation of color in Fig. 7, the reader is referred to the web version of
is article.
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cost savings from load shifting of 24.4 EUR (33.4 USD in October
2011) per household per year. The potential for greater cost sav-
ings in scenario INDIV can be explained by incorporating additional
appliance types (furnaces and electric vehicles) as well as PV pro-
duction. Also, both electricity prices and consumption behavior in
Europe differ from those in Texas.
Scenario COOP results in annual savings of 74 USD. Evidently,
consumer cooperation has an economic advantage. From a grid sta-
bility perspective however, pure price-driven DR seems to be coun-
terproductive. The peak load jumps from 28.1 kW (BASE) to over
29.3 kW (INDIV and COOP), an increase of 4.1%. The increase in
kurtosis of 2.1% (INDIV) and 1.2% (COOP) also indicates that there
is not only a more pronounced maximum peak but that the entire
load profile is more extreme. For energy providers, residential DR
activities therefore not only lead to lower revenue but also mean
that they have to manage more extreme load profiles. Thus, we
suggest that energy providers should consider different pricing
schemes for consumers who follow price-driven DR programs.
Table 8 illustrates the aggregated results for the two-part pric-
ing scheme (tariff 6). Without DR (scenario NO-DR), this tariff sub-
stantially increases electricity cost by 29.9% compared to BASE.
Also, Table 8 indicates that scenario INDIV leads to neither cost
savings nor peak reduction. In terms of the electricity cost, this is
because the underlying tariff is designed for customers with a peak
load of between 10 kW and 50 kW. Each individual consumer
alone has a far lower peak, however. The sum of all the individual
peaks on the other hand is much higher than the aggregated peak
load of the cooperative. Therefore, energy providers would need to
offer tariffs with a different mix of capacity charges and retail
adjustment factors to individual customers. The lack of peak reduc-
tion stems from the way that independent households optimize
their profiles. Individual households only know their own loads,
and reduce their own peak, which generally occurs at a different
time for each household. Thus, the overall peak is usually not the
sum of all individual peaks but rather occurs at a time when all
households are consuming above average simultaneously. This
consequently means that the overall peak is not affected by theoptimization efforts of individual households. Energy providers
should therefore actively encourage centrally coordinated energy
cooperatives. Based on these first insights, we expect scenario
COOP to deliver the most promising results and focus on this sce-
nario in the rest of this paper.
Comparing scenario COOP in Tables 7 and 8 show that the
potential savings from cooperative DR increase from 6.8% under
tariff 1–10.0% under the two-part tariff 6. This equates to annual
savings per household of 109 USD. By making the customer worse
off in the general case (NO-DR) but offering higher savings under
DR (COOP), the tariff thus offers a strong peak-shaving incentive
for cooperatives. Also, the peak load decreases by 14.5%, and kurto-
sis is reduced by 8.1%, indicating that the aggregated load profile is
considerably less extreme.
The positive characteristics of the cooperative case are also vis-
ible in Fig. 7, which compares the aggregated load curves resulting
from cooperative DR under tariffs 1 and 6 for a sample week in
October. The green1 (dash-dotted) line depicts the results for tariff
1 without a peak pricing component and the red (solid) line the
results for tariff 6. Whereas the first tariff produces a new peak at
the end of day 5 (purple dotted box) the second tariff not only pre-
vents this new peak but also reduces the peak load below the base-
line scenario’s peak at all times. The pronounced peak reduction and
the less extreme load profile are clearly beneficial to energy provi-
ders. As this is combined with the higher potential savings for cus-
tomers, we argue that a tariff which includes both dynamic prices
and a peak pricing component benefits consumers and energy provi-
ders alike.
Table 9 compares the results for all the tariffs. Notably, the peak
reduction effect already occurs under the tariff with the smallest
capacity-pricing component (tariff 2) and does not increase signif-
icantly with a rising share of capacity pricing. However, the costs
for the scenarios without DR (BASE and NO-DR) increase progres-
sively from tariff 1 (consumption-based) to tariff 6 (two-part)
but decrease for scenario COOP.th
Fig. 8. Peak reduction vs electricity cost. It is striking that the peak reduction already occurs under tariff 2 and that the peak load level remains constant for the other two-part
tariffs while the electricity costs drop further.
Table 9
Simulation results for different tariffs.
Tariff Scenario Electricity
cost (in $)
Electricity cost reduction
(change in % compared to BASE)
Peak load
(in kW)
Peak load reduction
(in % of BASE)
Load
kurtosis
Load kurtosis reduction
(change in % compared to BASE)
1 BASE 209.7 0.0 28.1 0.0 3.2 0.0
(RAF = 2.34 CC = 0.00) COOP 195.6 6.8 29.3 4.1 3.3 1.2
2 NO-DR 222.1 5.9 28.1 0.0 3.2 0.0
(RAF = 2.20 CC = 1.90) COOP 193.7 7.6 24.2 13.9 3.0 7.8
3 NO-DR 234.5 11.8 28.1 0.0 3.2 0.0
(RAF = 2.06 CC = 3.80) COOP 192.6 8.2 24.1 14.2 3.0 7.8
4 NO-DR 247.8 18.1 28.1 0.0 3.2 0.0
(RAF = 1.93 CC = 5.70) COOP 191.9 8.5 24.1 14.2 3.0 8.0
5 NO-DR 260.1 24.0 28.1 0.0 3.2 0.0
(RAF = 1.79 CC = 7.60) COOP 190.1 9.4 23.9 14.9 3.0 8.2
6 NO-DR 272.5 29.9 28.1 0.0 3.2 0.0
(RAF = 1.65 CC = 9.50) COOP 188.7 10.0 24.0 14.5 3.0 8.1
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and potential cost savings. The higher the capacity-pricing compo-
nent grows, the more the financial incentive for cooperative peak
shaving increases. However, energy providers are tempted to offer
tariffs with a very small element of capacity pricing but a high peak
reduction to cost ratio.
To design new effective energy tariffs, three central findings of
our work have to be considered:
(i) Effective peak shaving only works in a centrally coordinated
setting. The more households pool their loads, the better this
will be in terms of peak shaving.
(ii) Two-part tariffs have to be tailored to the size of the cooper-
ative with regard to the monthly peak load.
(iii) The extent of the capacity charge in two-part tariffs influ-
ences the potential savings that can be achieved by cooper-
ative DR.
In a nutshell, energy providers need to create tariffs that incen-
tivize not only peak-shaving behavior but also the formation of
large cooperatives to increase the effects. Our results indicate that,
in terms of peak shaving, the bigger the cooperative grows, the bet-
ter the results are for the energy provider. However, our research
ignores any geographical or capacity constraints. Thus, more work
is still needed to examine the effects of cooperative size and to
determine what types of tariffs might provide win-win situations
for both households and energy providers. Especially peak charges
should be tailored to reflect weak spots in residential grids. These
bottlenecks are often distribution transformers that connect indi-
vidual neighborhoods to the wider distribution grid [45]. We
assume that capacity pricing might thus be suited best for moder-
ately sized residential microgrids which only cover a single
neighborhood.5. Conclusion
The purpose of this work is to provide a realistic estimation of
the economic benefits that cooperative demand response can offer
to households and energy providers. We therefore created an eval-
uation framework which included a cooperative market environ-
ment and a load-scheduling model. We applied this framework
to a very detailed dataset covering 201 households in Austin,
Texas. As a first step we show that, with a real-time market pricing
scheme, demand response measures lead to cost savings of 5.5%.
Cooperative behavior adds further savings of 1.3%.
However, with a real-time market pricing scheme shifting deci-
sions result in more extreme load profiles. We therefore propose to
introduce two-part pricing schemes that incorporate a capacity-
pricing component. Such schemes can reduce peaks by an average
of 14.5%, and increase the savings potential for cooperatives to
10.0%. Thus, two-part tariffs can create win-win situations for
energy providers and customers alike.
Furthermore, we find that effective peak reduction is only pos-
sible in a cooperative setting. The results improve when more par-
ticipants pool their loads. Thus the optimal amount of capacity
pricing should be determined not only by the need to incentivize
peak shaving but also by what will stimulate the creation of larger
cooperatives.6. Limitations and potential for future research
There are two major operational challenges to cooperative
demand response which we did not account for in our calculations.
Firstly, we did not consider how to fairly share the benefits among
the members of the cooperative. This reallocation is important
however, to encourage households to constantly contribute
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has access to all relevant load and price information. In real life,
neither load curves nor prices are known in advance, and mecha-
nisms need to rely on often inaccurate forecasts. Especially load
forecasting at the individual household level can be challenging
as users tend to behave unpredictably. With broader adoption of
residential DSM, price forecasting will also become more complex
as each cooperative’s shifting decision can influence prices.
Against the backdrop of these challenges, our estimations likely
overestimate the actual operational benefits of cooperative
demand response. Recent research is up to the forecasting chal-
lenge however and new methods can yield good predictions even
for individual homes [46]. Similarly, price forecasting models also
increasingly offer good accuracy and computational efficiency
[47]. We consequently believe that, with constantly improving
predictions for both prices and loads, energy cooperatives can facil-
itate considerable operational savings.
The results might vary for different markets however. Even
though the US market is undoubtedly one of the most important
in the world, we would like to see our results verified using
European data, i.e. electricity prices as well as usage data. Air
conditioning units for example are much less common in many
European countries. Nevertheless, due to the low electricity prices
in the US we expect that our results will not deviate significantly in
a European setting.
Ultimately, we believe that there are two additional levers that
could make cooperative demand response even more beneficial.
The first option is to include other forms of renewable energy.
Specifically, we suggest investigating the effects of wind turbines,
as owned by many cooperatives in Germany, Denmark and the
Netherlands [48]. We also believe that storage plays a key role in
increasing the benefits of cooperative demand response, and we
plan to extend our model in the near future.
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